Special Forces of Crossing: Cloud's Anti-Japanese

Chapter 2975 Telegram Incident
Yamaguchi will make such an inference, which has a lot to do with his enthusiasm for reading "Three Kingdoms" and his like to learn "commanding skills" from it.Among the counselors of the Three Kingdoms, all those who can truly be called national scholars are good at trying to figure out people's hearts.In Yamaguchi's view, he believes that only commanders who are good at understanding people's hearts can be regarded as "conductors", and Bai Chongxi is undoubtedly the best in this regard among the senior Chinese generals in active service.

Yamaguchi's deduction was only half right-the calculation of Jin's character traits was indeed in Bai Chongxi's plan, but this was by no means the whole story.

It is one of the qualities that an excellent commander must possess to study the personality characteristics of the enemy's supreme commander, find out the flaws in his command and arrange them accordingly.In order to achieve this, the improvement of intelligence data is essential.In that time and space, even if Bai Chongxi had a chance to face Jin, but because the Chinese side lacked relevant intelligence materials, he could not make the above arrangement.In this time and space, the reason why he was able to play such a wonderful move at this time is all thanks to Kong Lingyi.Because Kong Lingyi was able to obtain intelligence from high-level U.S. officials in the first place, Bai Chongxi knew that Truman was extremely dissatisfied with Jin and wanted to replace him, and he also thought of targeting the U.S. Pacific Fleet in response to Jin's eagerness to make contributions.

Facts have proved that Bai Chongxi's arrangement was successful.

Yamaguchi is also considered a great talent, otherwise he would not be able to judge the Chinese tactical intention in a very short period of time and immediately ask Koizumi Toshiichiro for higher intelligence authority of the combined fleet.However, because neither he nor Koizumi knew the real reason why Kim was "quick for quick success", it was doomed that they would never be able to obtain a higher command authority of the US Pacific Fleet from the Americans.

Only by prescribing the right medicine will be curative. If you don't know what disease the other party has, but use the medicine indiscriminately, the result may be counterproductive.Jiwan was attacked, and a large stockpile of supplies and fuel was burned, which was also a heavy blow to Koizumi.Because he knows that the US-Japan joint fleet can completely suppress the Chinese Pacific Fleet, but because the supplies cannot keep up, it means that the joint fleet cannot turn the hope of victory into fruitful fruits in a short period of time, and he supports the local fleet quickly. Ideas are bound to fail to come true.On the day he received Yamaguchi's telegram, he personally drafted the telegram and urged the communications department to send it to Washington immediately.In the telegram, he bluntly proposed to Truman that the root cause of the Pacific Raiders' success was the lack of coordination in the command of the combined fleet. This is the only way to ensure that the Pacific Raiders will live up to pre-war expectations.At the end of the telegram, he pointed out more cryptically that the reason why the United Fleet has made no achievements during this period has a lot to do with Kim's arbitrariness, and the analysis made by the Japanese staff based on the available information shows that Commander Kim The command characteristics and personality characteristics of the US Navy have been thoroughly studied by the Chinese side, so only a few days ago, the US Pacific Fleet became China's priority attack target.And if the combined fleet does not make corrections in command, such incidents will happen again...

A very bad diplomatic cable -

Whether Toshiichiro Koizumi's telegram has been polished by his staff and civilian staff is a mystery in the research of related historical topics in later generations.The vast majority of military historians in later generations believe that, given Koizumi’s status at the time, his telegram must have been polished or even revised by his subordinates, and based on this, he concluded that what Koizumi committed was definitely not a common sense mistake. It's that he didn't realize at all how fragile the so-called US-Japan alliance was at the time.There are even extreme ones who simply believe that Koizumi’s telegram “has made the greatest contribution” to the defeat of the United States and Japan in the Second Pacific War—it made the already weak alliance between the United States and Japan even more fragile, and in the Yamaguchi and Jin Zhijian created a gap, making the two people who were already wary of each other even more antagonistic.

That's right, the real situation at the time was that US President Truman was really dissatisfied with King's performance and wanted to replace him.However, this by no means means that Koizumi is qualified to make irresponsible remarks on Kim's command or even his character.After all, in the minds of Truman and all Americans, no matter how bad or incompetent Jin is, he is their child. They can beat and scold him wantonly, but they will never allow others to bully him.As far as Truman was in the situation at the time, because of the difficult situation in the South American war, the voice of opposition to war with China in the United States was loud at that time. He had already regretted forming an alliance with Japan at that time. Koizumi sent this telegram again, which would be like adding fuel to the fire Oil.

"A telegram caused even greater cracks in the already fragile alliance between the United States and Japan. It is conceivable that, as the actual executors of the US-Japan military alliance at that time, this would bring serious consequences to Commander Kim and Commander Yamaguchi. What a bad influence—" These are the comments made by a well-known military historian in his later book on the "telegram incident" in his book on the study of the Second Pacific War.

A very objective evaluation.

As a veteran general of the U.S. Navy, King is by no means alone in the country, so even if Truman concealed the news of this telegram for the sake of the overall situation, he would obtain relevant information through other channels.This should have been taken into account, so Truman did not hide the telegram information from him.Even, perhaps thinking that this was an opportunity to motivate Jin and the US Pacific Fleet, he forwarded most of the content of the telegram to Jin, and asked Jin and his soldiers to cheer up and use practical actions to prove that the Japanese It is wrong: "I, as well as everyone in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believe that you and your subordinates are worthy of our trust, so we are willing to give the Pacific Fleet the greatest support as always..."

For historians of later generations, this is another interesting historical data.

Historically, the declassification of this secret was about ten years later than the "telegram incident" created by Koizumi. This time gap made the images of Truman and King in the "telegram incident" and even the Second Pacific War not negatively affected at all. The influence has always been prominent.

Of course, none of this has anything to do with winning.

The atmosphere of the United States-Japan Joint Fleet Joint Command began to become delicate because of the two telegrams, and Chen Ce and Bai Chongxi were unaware of this.At this time, in the minds of Chen Ce and Bai Chongxi, they still positioned themselves as the weak, so the strategy they implemented was still mainly to weaken the US-Japan joint fleet.

(End of this chapter)