Daming 1805

Chapter 391 Monarch Power and Prime Minister Power

Emperor Zhu Jianyan of the Ming Dynasty lived in the palace for a few days. Together with his father, the Supreme Emperor Zhu Zhongliang, they analyzed and discussed the direction of subsequent reforms based on Zhu Jingyuan's suggestions.

Although Zhu Jingyuan is special, Zhu Jingyuan's suggestion is still just a suggestion, and Zhu Jianyan still has to make the final decision.

Many of Zhu Jingyuan's idealized ideas are often pushed by Zhu Jianyan and Zhu Zhongliang to implement realistic plans.

For example, Zhu Jingyuan believes that the actual grade of Jiuqing can be given to the first rank first, or directly to the first rank, and at the same time it is suggested to directly give the first rank.

This is Zhu Jingyuan's habitual generosity, while Zhu Jianyan and Zhu Zhongliang are habitually "stingy".

Zhu Jianyan's natural choice is to confer the first rank of Jiuqing at the beginning, and after three or six years, or even when he is about to retire, he will be promoted to the first rank of "honorary retirement".

At the same time, as the people who knew the political system of Ming Dynasty best, Zhu Jianyan and Zhu Zhongliang considered more details.

For example, after the establishment of Dayu and the administration of Jiuqing, how to ensure that the actual status of the local provinces directly under the Central Government is higher than that of Dayu?

If Jiuqing is in charge of several central government offices of the imperial court and is also the corresponding head of a large domain, will Jiuqing be biased towards the large domain he is in charge of when handling daily affairs?
If targeted adjustments are not made, the affairs of the so-called provinces directly under the Central Government will still be handed over to the corresponding competent department after the establishment of the Jiuqing in charge, and then transferred to the Jiuqing in charge of the corresponding affairs.

The provinces directly under the central government will need to contact all the departments, and all the Jiuqing will ultimately handle their own affairs.

On the other hand, the affairs of the big domain that Jiuqing is in charge of are directly sent to a confirmed in charge of Jiuqing through the six classified officials in charge of the guardian, governor, criminal officer, and censor determined locally in Dayu.

Under such circumstances, Zhu Jianyan felt that if it was Jiuqing, even if he did not intentionally favor the large domain he was in charge of, he would definitely be more familiar with the officials in the large domain he was directly in charge of, and had direct decision-making power over the affairs, so there was no need to go to him. Others, and take it for granted to prioritize these matters.

This will also allow Jiuqing in charge to obtain the "power" corresponding to the large domain.

Taizu Zhu Yuanzhang prohibited the establishment of a prime minister, and his original intention was to merge the power of the prime minister into the hands of the emperor.

The essence of Xiangquan is another "universal decision-making power" outside the monarch and within the bureaucratic system.

Decision-making power is very important, but "common use" is even more important, which is the "core" of another bureaucratic system.

The bureaucratic system has its own core, and it can handle most things without the emperor.

Zhu Yuanzhang collected the power of prime minister into the hands of the emperor, and merged the general decision-making power of the entire imperial court, all of which were concentrated in the emperor.

Except for the emperor, there is no single individual in the imperial court who has the right to make decisions on most of the government affairs at the same time.

All officials are only decision makers under a certain limited condition, a decision maker within a category.

The whole country, all the affairs of the whole imperial court, and the ultimate goal of collection, have the emperor alone, the only core of the emperor Ming.

Prior to this, there were usually at least two decision-making cores in the court bureaucratic system of the traditional feudal dynasty in China.

At least one main core is the emperor, and one or more secondary cores are prime ministers.

The imperial court lacks a main core, or the main core is irresponsible, and the other secondary cores can still maintain the basic integrity of the system and maintain the normal operation of the system.

But since Zhu Yuanzhang, the core of the bureaucratic system of the central court has only remained the main core of the emperor.

Without the core of the emperor, the system is directly divided into several parts, and normal interaction cannot be completed with each other.

The imperial court and the bureaucratic system cannot function normally, at least they cannot continue to operate legally.

Zhu Yuanzhang blocked the possibility of the emergence of the second core with a complete set of top-level structures, and truly pushed the centralization to the limit.

Since Zhu Yuanzhang, there has never been a de facto official in power.

Even if the emperor doesn't care about it at all, it is an indispensable part of maintaining the operation of the court.

Even if the existing emperor is killed, another emperor must be established, otherwise the whole system will still not work.

In the era before the Renwu Dynasty, there were cases where the academicians did not "vote drafts", and the emperor's direct decrees were called "Zhongzhi", which might not be implemented.

But this does not mean that "Zhongzhi" is an illegal document in the modern sense.

The imitation of the ticket is not a necessary condition for the legality of the imperial decree. The imperial decree and the emperor's will are the law.

Officials who refuse to implement are actually resisting the order.

The grand scholars at that time were equivalent to the representatives and leaders of the bureaucracy. What they did not vote was to show that the bureaucracy did not support the emperor's decision.

This situation shows that the imperial power and the civil official group did not reach an agreement, and the emperor wanted to forcefully push what he wanted to do.

As the bureaucratic system and the civil service group continue to expand, the bureaucratic system is resisting the imperial power by refusing to implement it.

No vote is a signal sent out by the leader of the bureaucracy, which means that it is equivalent to shouting to all officials:
"Everyone is not allowed to do what the emperor said. Whoever does things for the emperor will have good fruit for you in the future!"

The reason why lower-level officials did not implement it was actually because they were worried that they would be squeezed out by the bureaucratic system in the future, rather than saying that the imperial decree was illegal.

If the emperor has subordinates that he can fully control, if the emperor's controller can independently carry out the executive power of his own will, he will not care whether the imperial decree is drafted or not.

The process of Emperor Shizu's ascension to power was the process of rebuilding his own team, and it also directly shattered the so-called voting convention.

Zhu Jianyan, who was the emperor, and Zhu Zhongliang, who was the emperor, were more sensitive to the power of the prime minister than the courtiers.

So after realizing this problem, they quickly made a decision.

While setting up the central court to be in charge of the Jiuqing, it is necessary to adjust and clarify the decision-making scope of the Jiuqing.

Jiuqing can still only be the decision-maker in a certain range, and is not the final decision-maker.

Zong Bo is equivalent to the Minister of Rites before the Renwu Dynasty, only in charge of culture, etiquette, and education; Zhong Zai is equivalent to the former Minister of Officials, who only manages the construction of the bureaucratic system; .

Situ is in charge of finance and taxation, Sikong is in charge of industry and construction, Sikou is in charge of the construction of the rule of law, and so on.

In the end, it was generally in accordance with Zhu Zhongliang's thinking, and the distribution was basically done according to the traditional responsibilities of Jiuqing.

At the same time, adjustments were made according to the actual situation, for example, the civil administration was removed from Situ, who was in charge of finance, and assigned to Tai Cuo.

At the same time, Jiuqing cannot be the real chief official of Dayu, nor can he have the "general decision-making power" in the Dayu he is in charge of.

Before the Renwu Dynasty and after Zhu Yuanzhang, although the general decision-making power of the central government office was fully obtained, the local decision-making power was often unified in the hands of the officials in charge.

Governors and governors are both local general decision makers in some form.

After the Renwu Dynasty, all local decision-making powers were separated again. The governors and governors, who had been basically fixed, gradually returned to the original mode of special missions and cancellations after the incidents were completed.

Independent judicial and supervisory agencies have also been established at both the prefecture and county levels, and prefects and county magistrates are no longer the only ones.

Now, of course, it is impossible to hand over the general decision-making power of a large domain to the in charge of Jiuqing.

Zhu Jianyan and Zhu Zhongliang are not even going to give Jiuqing direct decision-making power in any large-scale affairs.

The main position of the Nine Ministers is also the official first position, which is determined to be the affairs of several central government offices assigned to govern.

They would become members of the highest decision-making group of the central court under the emperor.

But not the chief officer in charge of the Great Domain.

The chief officials of Dayu are still the governor, the guards, the judges, and the censors. Most of the local routine affairs should be directly decided by them locally, reducing the proportion of affairs that the central court is involved in.

Otherwise, the goal of reducing the work pressure of the central government office will not be achieved.

Among the remaining affairs that still need to be reported to the central court, most of the routine affairs still have to be handed over to the corresponding central government office according to the procedures, and cannot be directly sent to the Jiuqing in charge.

After the establishment of the Governor of the Great Domain, the Protector, the Prosecutor, and the Censor, for the various departments of the imperial court, it is equivalent to merging several or even dozens of provinces in the Great Domain into a larger province.

The number of people who need to be contacted by the corresponding department has been directly reduced by an order of magnitude.

Although Dayu has six chief officials, as the emperor who controls the "universal decision-making power", if he wants to directly manage Dayu, of course he is familiar with the situation of all 54 chief officials in all Dayu.

However, every department of the imperial court has no general decision-making power, and is only responsible for a specific type of affairs.

The person they actually need to contact is only the corresponding one of the six chief officials in each large domain.

The Ministry of Household Affairs is in charge of civil affairs. It only needs to contact the governor in charge. Those who often deliver official documents must be the documents of the governor. It is not necessary to care who the governor is. It is impossible to know how many staff members the governor has.

The Ministry of War is in charge of the military budget. It only needs to contact the governor, and it doesn't need to care who the general guard is.

The Ministry of Punishments and the Metropolitan Procuratorate only need to contact the procurator and don't need to pay attention to government and military affairs.

For each department, nine large domains means nine more contacts, and the growth rate is completely acceptable.

On the other hand, the executives of Dayu are only in charge of a certain stall, and there are still only a few departments that need to be contacted.

Therefore, there will be no problem in the way of sending the affairs of the large domain directly to the department in charge.

After these matters reach the corresponding department, those that require Jiuqing to make a decision will be sent to the corresponding Jiuqing.

Jiuqing is also in charge of several departments. It mainly deals with ministers with only five or six departments, and at most a dozen ministers in total, as well as a few clerical staff who often come to deliver documents.

They can also deal with it relatively easily.

In the end, only Zhu Zhongliang and Zhu Jianyan specifically listed special matters that the emperor thought should and was necessary to let the emperor know directly, and that needed to be handed over directly for decision-making, which could be sent directly to the emperor through the Jiuqing in charge of Dayu.

The decision-making power of these matters still remains in the hands of the emperor, rather than being exercised by the nine ministers in charge.

Jiuqing, who is in charge of Dayu, is the bridge for direct communication between the emperor and Dayu, and the middleman between the emperor and Dayu.

There are too many officials in Dayu, and they can go directly to the emperor, but the emperor can't manage it, so let Jiuqing, who is in charge, do the transfer.

In the end, the direct relationship between Jiuqing and Dayu was characterized by Zhu Jianyan as the role of conveying, coordinating, and appeasing.

In most cases, there will be no direct contact between the two parties.

It is only in very special circumstances that the relationship between the two parties really shows itself.

This relationship is not important in normal times, but it is very important in special times.

They are the passage for the officials of the Great Domain to skip the central functional departments and go directly to the emperor.

For the emperor, it was a means of checks and balances between the chief officials of Dayu and the bureaucrats of the central ministries, and it was also a means of checks and balances between the nine ministers who had great real power.

If the central department corresponding to the responsibility is not responsible, and the Jiuqing in charge of the department corresponding to the affairs is not responsible, the officials of Dayu can bring the matter to the emperor through the Jiuqing in charge of their own Dayu.

In charge of Jiuqing and the affairs department corresponding to Jiuqing, in most cases there will not be one.

After Zhu Jianyan and Zhu Zhongliang considered the positioning of the actual establishment of Jiuqing, they continued to consider the positioning of the local provinces directly under the central government.

The overall idea is to improve their status and ensure that they have a real direct status.

The most simple and direct solution is to upgrade the rank of officials.

The chief envoys of the local provinces, the command envoys, the inspectors, and the patrol censors were all promoted to the second rank.

On the same level as the Governor, Protectorate, and Criminal Officer of Dayu, as well as the ministers of the Central Government Office.

The ranks of middle and lower bureaucrats in other provinces directly under the central government are also one level higher than that of the big domain bureaucrats.

The chief officer of the big domain can send specific affairs directly to the emperor by taking charge of the nine ministers.

The chief envoys, commanders, inspectors, and censors of the provinces directly under the Central Government can also deliver similar matters directly to the cabinet, and convey them to the emperor through specific cabinet scholars.

Each cabinet maester is responsible for receiving special reports from two or three native provinces.

Of course, the decision-making power also remains entirely in the hands of the emperor.

This strategy is also a matter of course.

The outer dynasty has increased the number of bureaucrats with real power who may even become first-rank officials. The status of the academicians who are the emperor's personal staff should also be improved accordingly.

Therefore, Zhu Jianyan and Zhu Zhongliang also considered the adjustment of the cabinet's status and responsibilities.

Before the Renwu Dynasty, the rank of the Cabinet Grand Scholars themselves was only the fifth rank, but under normal circumstances, they would be promoted to the second rank with the titles of Shangshu and Minister, and they might even be awarded the first rank with Sangong and Sangu.

After the Renwu Dynasty, the official title of the cabinet scholar was no longer given to the foreign court, but all his grades were mentioned as the second rank. Before retirement, the honorary title was added according to the situation, from the first rank or the first rank.

In the future, according to the actual situation, after taking office, they will actually be sealed to the first rank, and before retirement, they will be selectively sealed to the first rank, and may even be given a title.

Staff decentralization is a reality that everyone tries to avoid, but none of them can completely avoid.

Although Emperor Shizu returned the cabinet scholars back to the prototype of the staff and maintained them for decades, he did not leave behind the ancestral system that forbade the great scholars from being given power.

Among the many reforms that violated the ancestral system, adding a duty of conveying special news to the Grand Scholars is not a big deal at all, there are too many bigger things than this.

If the emperor is the chairman and president, then in the future, there will be nine ministers, which are equivalent to vice presidents in charge of several departments.

If the former Cabinet Master was considered the president's secretary, he might become the president's assistant in the future.

(End of this chapter)